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This article  presents  some  basic  political  arithmetic  on  UK  economic  performance,  including
empirics on  the  sources  of  new  job  creation  and  regional  differences.  These  empirics  support
an  argument  about  the  need  for new  measures  and  concepts  of  national  success  and  failure.
This  is  so  because,  as  we show  in the  UK  case,  the  standard  post  1940  economic  measures
of GDP  and  unemployment  give  a seriously  misleading  picture  of  national  success.  This  is
an opportunity  for  accountants  to  join  with  others  in devising  new  measures  and  concepts.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. 
1. Introduction
We are currently seeing a revival of interest in the national economy in a world which until recently saw globalisation and
regional integration within Europe as established and irreversible. History does not repeat itself but the present form of early
21st century globalisation is coming under pressure in the early 2010s much as the pre-1914 form of internationalisation
did in the 1920s: accumulating economic imbalances, changed politics within and between major powers, fragile long
chains of debt and trade threaten economic crisis and disintegration. Once again, the stability of the international order
requires economic adjustments which are beyond the political capacity of the major governmental players and supranational
authority, as we see in the case of the on-going euro zone crisis or American down grading, or the Chinese trade surplus.
This raises the question about whether and how international and regional troubles will once again lead to a revaluation and
rediscovery of the national economy in the 2010s as they did in the 1930s. We  do not yet have a 1930s model of national
prosperity through autarchy but there are, for example in the UK, growing doubts about whether the national interest is
being served by the current pattern of trade and specialisation. Hence after 2008 the British political classes increasingly
talk about the need for a ‘rebalancing of the economy’ which means more domestic manufacturing and less dependence
on ﬁnancial services (Froud, Johal, Law, Leaver, & Williams, 2011, pp. 4–12). More recently, opinion has shifted, partly in
consequence of the UK government’s award of the Thameslink carriage building contract to Siemens that shifted assembly
to Germany and the impending redundancies at the Derby train building factory of Bombardier. The result has been media
angst and the redeﬁnition of public procurement as an industrial policy issue (e.g. Daily Mail, 16th July 2011; Financial Times,
18th July 2011; Guardian, 11th July 2011; Observer, 17th July 2011).
There are many ways of approaching this rediscovery and revaluation of the national economy and this article focuses
on issues around the conceptualisation and measurement of national success and failure by presenting empirics and argu-
ment about the British case. The article which does this is organised in a relatively straightforward way into four sections
∗ Corresponding author at: Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: karel.williams@manchester.ac.uk (K. Williams).
0155-9982 © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. 
doi:10.1016/j.accfor.2012.01.004
Open access under CC BY license.
Open access under CC BY license.
6 I. Erturk et al. / Accounting Forum 36 (2012) 5– 17
plus a conclusion. The ﬁrst section deals with how the standard economic measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
unemployment gave false readings of national success before 2008 and did not register unsustainability in the UK. The
second section considers the possibility of an alternative business model approach and how this is adumbrated in earlier
1970s discussions of deindustrialisation. Sections three and four then explore different aspects of how standard job cre-
ation and unemployment measures obscure key aspects of the UK’s current national problems. In particular, they do not
register the dependence of much new private sector employment on public funding which directly sustains the state sec-
tor; nor do unemployment rates capture the broader problem of surplus population and dependence on beneﬁts in the
ex-industrial areas of the North and West. A short conclusion suggests that the irrelevance of standard economic measures
is an opportunity for socially minded accountants and others to devise new and more relevant measures and concepts. The
discussion of the British case is of broader interest because it raises issues about national success and failure which are rele-
vant to other high income capitalist countries; and also about whether and how the national economy is the relevant unit of
analysis.
2. Post 1940 economic measures of success: GDP and unemployment
If methods format the world, so too do technical measures. But, in considering economic measurement, we should
remember that the history of economics (and its measures) is part of a larger history which is as much cultural as technical.
This is the point which is ably made in Esty’s (2004) cultural history of England between the wars. In the title of Esty’s
book, England is not deﬁned as a sinking island but as a ‘shrinking island’ because the decline of Empire leads to a discovery
of insular identity and national culture. The intellectual projection of national identity then ﬁgures not only in the essays,
poems and novels of canonical literary ﬁgures like T. S. Elliot or Virginia Woolf, but also in the economic writings of J.
M. Keynes. This is hardly surprising because Keynes was, as Esty (2004, p. 165) observes, a ‘Bloomsbury intimate’ with a
cultural hinterland nicely brought out in Skidelsky’s three volume biography (2005).  And thus Keynes’ General Theory of 1936
combines two key elements of old and new. The older element is the scientiﬁc ambition to construct an explicit ‘general
theory’ of capitalist economic dynamics which rested on the heroic assumption that the ‘marginal propensity to consume’ is
always less than one and that capitalism therefore has a tendency to under consume because investment does not steadily
compensate in a world where ‘animal spirits’ meet Knightian uncertainty. The newer element is an implicit (and taken for
granted) national frame: it is the national stock exchange and ignorant mass investors who amplify cyclical trends; and
the national government and its central bank are the only managers capable of delivering the necessary palliative which is
a ‘somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment’ around low interest rates and modest expectations of return, In
the ensuing 20 years, the prospect of this kind of radical Keynesian intervention to stabilise investment was  turned into an
anodyne practice of demand management and Keynesianism; just as Keynesian theory was domesticated by mainstream
economics as a special case of sticky wages (Leijonhufvud, 1968). But, from our point of view, the most important point is
that any and all activist national strategies for economic management depended on new concepts and measures which (after
a lag) were later developed in just a few years in the early and mid-1940s. National levels of economic activity and welfare
were encapsulated into two standard outcome metrics of national income or output (as in gross domestic product) and of
the rate of unemployment; the corollary measures of dynamic national success were growth of GDP and job creation. These
privileged measures combined bricolage and system building. The bricolage came through the incorporation into economics
of existing administrative measures of unemployment which were a knowledge by product of techniques of social insurance,
which tied the visible extent of unemployment to variable national rules. These changed when social insurance, introduced
in Britain after 1911, was extended under pressure of structural inter-war mass employment, and then changed again when
social insurance was consolidated by the post Beveridgean settlement. The element of system building was provided by
new kinds of national income accounting. The pioneering inter-war efforts of Clark and Kuznets were, under pressure of
British war time circumstance, developed into measures of national income. These measures were the prerequisite for
economic technologies to manage inﬂationary aggregate demand, ﬁrst introduced with Kingsley Wood’s 1941 budget and
its supporting White Paper (Cmd. 6397, 1942). This prosaically titled ofﬁcial text, An Analysis of the Sources of War  Finance
and an Estimate of the National. Income and Expenditure in 1938, 1940 and 1941, was  the ﬁrst to be constructed in and through
the new measurement system.
When the ﬁrst ofﬁcial national accounts were published in the United States in 1947, the US and other high income
countries entered a post-war world where trajectories of national success and failure were understood through the new
‘macro-economic’ measures of GDP growth, unemployment rates and job creation. This was how everybody recognised
they were living through the post-war long boom, which the French called ‘les trente glorieuses’ (Fourastié, 1979), even as
economists differed about its pre-conditions and ending. And although, much changed after 1979, the dominant national
frame was carried over. Thus, when a new post-1980s golden age was discovered by Stock and Watson (2002) and endorsed
by Bernanke (2004),  ‘the great moderation’ was practically deﬁned as a moderation in the amplitude of ﬂuctuations in
quarterly American GDP growth rates. The two key measures were also used as the benchmark of relative national success.
The superiority of the American model in the 1990s was upheld on the grounds that it generated growth and jobs which the
German and Japanese models did not (even though they produced manufactured exports). New Labour’s economic success
and Chancellor Brown’s repeated claims in the 2000s about ‘the end of boom and bust’ could not be doubted because they
were statistically corroborated by higher rates of GDP growth and lower rates of unemployment. Two  decades of certitude
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about how the standard measures captured achievement are epitomised by the vain glory of Gordon Brown in his 2005
Budget Statement which opened with a claim that:
‘Britain is today experiencing the longest period of sustained economic growth since records began.  . . Today I can
report economic growth for the ﬁftieth consecutive quarter. . . This year and next the euro area is forecast to grow
at 1.5% and then just over 2 per cent, Japan even more slowly at less than 1 per cent. . . And our forecast for British
growth this year is 3 to 3.5 per cent and in 2006 2.5 to 3 per cent. So it is Britain and North America that have over the
last eight years grown at twice the rate of most of our G7 competitors, our living standards also rising twice as fast. . .,
. . .In other countries high unemployment remains today the dominant economic issue. If Britain today had German,
French or euro levels of unemployment we would have 2 million fewer jobs and if we  had America’s higher level of
unemployment, there would be one third of a million fewer jobs. The ofﬁcial ﬁgures published today show that since
1997 we have created two million one hundred thousand jobs. This week, every working week, another 125,000 men
and women are ﬁnding new jobs. . .’
Brown (2005).
The fundamental post-Lehman question about ‘why did nobody see it coming?’ was  ﬁrst posed by Queen Elizabeth when
she opened the LSE’s new building (Daily Mail, 6th November 2008). It was feebly answered by the two British Academy
professors who argued that ‘many people did foresee the crisis’ but were wrong about the form, timing and ferocity of crisis
(Besley & Hennessy, 2009). More seriously, we would argue that politicians, regulators and central bankers were blind partly
because of models and partly because of measures. As Bezemer (2009) has argued convincingly, with detailed quotations
from heterodox economists like Wynne Godey and Michael Hudson, neo-Keynesian and Minskian theorists operating with
ﬂow of funds macro models did see that we were living through a housing bubble (even if they did not understand the risks
accumulating inside wholesale banking). And it was also partly a matter of measures because, as in the quotations above
from Gordon Brown, mainstream economists, politicians and regulators were ﬁxed on the two  standard outcome measures
which indicated success not increasing fragility and impending instability.
This was compounded by intellectual slackness and political complacency in reading the available statistical measures
because mainstream attention focused on bottom line outcomes rather than the constituent moving parts such as the
different elements of ﬁnal demand, the composition of investment and the objects of bank lending. All these constituent
elements had been part of the mind-set of the original 1940s innovators and many of the relevant magnitudes were indeed
ofﬁcially measured by the 1990s. Much information could have been gained before 2008 by cross referencing information
from different statistical series, even without access to ﬂow of funds models and such like.
This general point can be simply illustrated. One telling indicator of unproductive instability can be obtained by cross
referencing GDP growth against the Bank of England’s standard series on housing equity withdrawal (HEW) which gives a
fairly conservative measure because it excludes remortgaging for home improvement and all transaction costs which are
ofﬁcially classiﬁed as investment costs. Both series were widely cited before 2008 but they were very seldom put together
side by side. Under the Thatcher and Blair premierships, if we take nominal values, the value of HEW was  larger than GDP
growth under the Tories and New Labour. In the Thatcher years from 1979 to 1990, the value of HEW is £263 billion as
against GDP growth of £252 billion; while, under Blair from 1997 to 2007, the value of HEW is £382 billion as against GDP
growth of £376 billion. These comparisons are suggestive rather than conclusive because nobody knows how much of HEW
went into ﬁnal consumption demand in different periods; and how much was  reinvested, for example, in buy to let property
under New Labour. But the one available study of this issue by the Bank of England (2004) admits, after examination of
survey data, that between 40 and 50% of (gross) housing equity withdrawal became consumption demand. This should have
been the object of critical debate and, quite probably some alarm before 2007 (Fig. 1).
Why  the wilful blindness about how different indicators ﬁtted together into an alarming pattern? That needs a larger
explanation which is provided in After the Great Complacence (Engelen et al., 2011) which presents the ﬁnancial crisis as
an elite débâcle resulting from the fatal combination of opaque ﬁnancial innovation and the hubris of politicised expertise,
especially amongst central bankers like Mervyn King and Ben Bernanke who  did not recognise that the bricolage of the
markets was beyond control. The long run antidote is political as much as technical but must include new concepts and
measures for thinking about national welfare and activity beyond GDP, as well as some recognition that the standard
measures of employment can deliver seriously misleading indications.
3. An unsustainable national business model?
National income and output measures have been criticised by feminists, greens and other radicals on the grounds that
any measure of welfare needs to include more than marketable and material goods and services. So it could be quite properly
argued that, if we are interested in measuring welfare, we should impute some value to non-marketable outputs like domestic
care which is crucial to social reproduction; or that we need to recognise immaterial subtleties like happiness which almost
certainly do not increase pari passu with marketable output. If GDP does measure the wrong kinds of outputs, that does
not explain Gordon Brown’s vain glory and the widespread acceptance of his claims before 2008. The misrecognitions of
the mid-2000s concern not so much the wrong bottom line on output but a failure to consider how the different elements
ﬁt together. And from this point of view, the most urgent priority is not a better measure of output and welfare levels but
something like an extended concept of business model which can indicate whether and how welfare levels are sustainable.
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Fig. 1. Total UK Equity withdrawal and as a share of UK GDP (%).
The business model concept is usually applied to proﬁt making ﬁrms and industrial sectors as a way of thinking about the
sources of cost recovery. This usage was popularised and disparaged by Lewis (1999, p. 274) in his book on the new economy
where ‘all it really meant was how you planned to make money’. Our approach differs from existing usage in that it explicitly
focuses on two dimensions which allow exploration of public organisations like the BBC as well as private sector ﬁrms like
GE or Ford (Froud, Johal, Montgomerie, & Williams, 2010). First, we  would note that all ﬁrms, whether public or private have
a ‘cost recovery’ requirement (Williams, Haslam, Johal, & Williams, 1994) whether to make the ﬁnancial surplus required of
public companies by the stock market or to break even in the public sector. Second, the ﬁnancial requirement of cost recovery
is accompanied by a need to respond to the demands and expectations of key external stakeholders. All ﬁrms, whether public
or private, are embedded within social networks of obligation where key stakeholders make inﬂuential judgements about
ﬁrm performance and those judgements then have important feedback repercussions on key variables such as share price
in the private sector or the assessment of value for money in the public sector. In management school debates, strategists
have generally discussed the extent to which established discourse anticipates the business model concept (e.g. Amit & Zott,
2001; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Christensen, Laegreid, & Wise, 2002). Our usage is quite different because it brings
the concept into a socio-cultural ﬁeld where expectations of private proﬁt or public value for money are variable, just as
the key stakeholders and what they demand will be different in the German and UK private sectors; furthermore, viability
and credibility are socio culturally mediated by narratives of purpose and achievement which circulate between ﬁrm and
stakeholders (Froud, Johal, Leaver, Phillips, & Williams, 2009).
How can this concept be transposed so that we could better understand a national economy which is also a democracy?
Financial viability and stakeholder credibility are brought together through employment because jobs are the primary way
in which welfare is distributed in high income economies with or without elaborate welfare states. In the US case we have
IRS data which allows us to measure the dependence on earned income; and, if we consider the middle income quintiles
(quintiles 2–4) in 2006, between 76% and 83% of their income came from wages and salaries (Froud et al., 2010). If the issue of
viability and credibility is connected to employment, then we see that the obvious point of reference is not 1990s American
strategy literature but 1970s British debates about how deindustrialisation (or the decline of manufacturing) produces a trade
constrained national economy which was unable to generate the required quantum of employment without current account
imbalance and payments crisis. Singh’s (1977, p. 126) classic article effectively provides a Keynesian deﬁnition of sustainable
and unsustainable national business models: if manufacturing is the major source of foreign earnings, an ‘inefﬁcient’ national
manufacturing sector cannot generate the exports to pay for imports with an economy at full employment; and an efﬁcient
manufacturing sector is one whose exports pay for national import requirements ‘at socially acceptable levels of output,
employment and the exchange rate’. What we would do is insert this kind of economist’s perception into a less mechanical
and more socio-cultural world. In this world, an unsustainable and failing national economy can be turned into a narrative
success which also has a performative dimension (up to a point) because the narrative inﬂuences the willingness of the
ﬁnancial markets to lend on capital account and bridge any current account deﬁcit.
I. Erturk et al. / Accounting Forum 36 (2012) 5– 17 9
Fig. 2. UK current account, goods and service trade balance (nominal £m).
The narrative and performative elements, which Singh did not consider, do not of course entirely abolish the structure
of constraints which concerned 1970s Cambridge economists. Their work was  forgotten because of the windfall gains from
North Sea oil and gas and as long as global ﬁnancial markets was  relaxed about lending capital to balance current account
deﬁcits. However, that tolerance cannot be taken for granted in the UK in 2011 when the capital markets are picking off
vulnerable European economies one after another. The UK is vulnerable because its trade deﬁcit on manufactures stands
at £80 billion in 2009 (OECD.Stat Extracts accessed 24/6/2010) and there is no other source of current account earnings
which can steadily compensate. The oil is running out physically and high oil prices are a double edged sword as the UK
imports an increasing proportion of total consumption. Services generally have a much lower propensity to export than
manufacturing. Finance does make a reasonable contribution because it does generates an export surplus which grew from
£11,769 million to £32,919 million between 1999 and 2009 and went some way to covering the deﬁcit on trade in goods
which increased from £29,051 million to £81,875 million over the same period (OECD.Stat Extracts accessed 24/6/2010)
(Fig. 2).
But, even in the bubble years before 2008, there was no realistic prospect that a surplus from ﬁnance would cover the
deﬁcit on manufactures: furthermore, since 2008 we understand that the private trade surplus on ﬁnance comes at the
expense of offsetting public sector liabilities for bailouts and other subventions. The medium term outlook is unfavourable.
And that is so, even if we ignore the complication that further public subvention of banking may  be required once again
after European sovereign default; and even if we suppose the ﬁnancial markets will continue to lend to Britain at reasonable
rates for some time because they are distracted by worse problems elsewhere. On current trends, the medium term current
account deﬁcit will increase to the point where the markets will panic. Two senior Cambridge economists (Coutts & Rowthorn,
2010, p. 15)  have recently returned to the theme of payments constraint: their model projects a deﬁcit which increases to
almost 5% of GDP which is, according to Bergsten (2002),  in ‘a danger zone of current account unsustainability’ for industrial
countries. It helps greatly that Britain did not join the euro but depreciation of the pound does no more than slow continuing
balance of payments deterioration, as we can see if we look at the effects of the 25% depreciation against the euro after 2007
(Fig. 3).
Britain (with exchange rate depreciation) has the same problem as the Mediterranean European Union countries (within
the euro zone), i.e. a large appetite for consuming imports from Germany and low wage Asia that cannot easily be paid for
by exports, because the country has no clear role in the new and more international division of labour which can give it the
capacity to generate current account export earnings on the scale necessary to pay for imports. Though little discussed, the
British economy going forward is balance of payments constrained as Cambridge economists in the 1970s had feared. Thus,
letting go of manufacturing has turned out badly for the UK, as is recognised in a confused way  in the current political and
media discussions of the desirability of ‘rebalancing’ which do not engage with any of the practical difﬁculties of rebuilding
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Fig. 3. UK manufacturing imports and exports and the Pound to Euro exchange rate, 1970–2008.
broken supply chains (Froud et al., 2011). In the 2010s, the outcome may  be worse than anticipated in the earlier apocalyptic
visions of the 1970s because the jobs growth and unemployment indicators have been giving readings which camouﬂage
worsening structural problems.
4. Job creation and the dependence on state funding
One of the reasons for misplaced optimism before 2008 was that the various indicators of the number of employees,
workers and jobs all suggested that the British economy had become (in the aggregate) a remarkable job creation machine.
Table 1 presents a broad overview of the number of UK jobs in the aggregate and in various key sectors. The number of jobs
did not steadily increase under the Conservatives (from 1979 to 1996) but there were nevertheless more than one million
extra jobs in 1997 after UK employment had increased from 27.3 million to 28.6 million. Then, in the New Labour years, more
than 2 million extra jobs were created so that UK employment had increased from 28.6 to 31.0 million. This outcome of jobs
growth is all the more remarkable if we consider the sectoral sub-trends. Manufacturing employment declines unsteadily
under the Conservatives from 6.6 to 4.2 million between 1979 and 1997 and then remorselessly every year under New
Labour from 4.3 to 2.6 million between 1997 and 2009. Quite remarkably, the ﬁnance sector does nothing for increased
employment in its long boom from the early 1990s because increases in turnover and assets did not require extra workers;
so, the ﬁnance sector which employed just 1.0 million at the point of deregulation and ‘Big Bang’ in the 1980s employed no
more than 1.1 million in 2009. But other services of all kinds hugely increased employment by some 8 million over the whole
period from 17.3 million jobs in 1979 to 21.7 million in 1997 and then to 25.5 million in 2010, when 82.5% of the workforce
was engaged in services. If Thatcher had embarked on an enterprise experiment of ﬂexible labour markets and low rates of
taxes on high incomes and corporate proﬁts, this was apparently vindicated by the results in terms of job creation which
Gordon Brown presented triumphantly.
But ﬁrst impressions are misleading because the categories of ofﬁcial statistics conceal the increasing dependence of
the economy on state-funded employment; and, insofar as the increase in employment depends on increased government
expenditure, the outcome is both unsustainable in the long run and has very little to do with the Thatcher experiment
in labour market ﬂexibility and other much vaunted reforms. None of this was obvious because ofﬁcial statistics have
traditionally classiﬁed workers and jobs as public or private sector, according to the identity of the employer as public
sector organisation or privately owned ﬁrm. But the position is increasingly confused after 1979: ﬁrst, by privatisation
which switches workers between state and private sector; and then, by outsourcing and sub-contracting which creates an
increasingly important para-state sector where private employment is sustained by public funding. All these confusions
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Table 1
UK workforce jobs 1978–2010.
UK workforce jobs Manufacturing Financial and insurance activities Total services
000s  000s 000s 000s
1978 26,862 6643 809 16,847
1979  27,283 6616 832 17,259
1980 27,239 6340 868 17,465
1981 26,223 5709 886 17,210
1982 25,763 5410 883 17,205
1983  25,457 5115 910 17,250
1984  26,162 5026 944 17,899
1985  26,476 5011 975 18,260
1986 26,524 4902 1001 18,467
1987 27,054 4870 1050 18,954
1988  28,023 4940 1135 19,715
1989 28,908 4978 1194 20,330
1990  29,224 4868 1215 20,783
1991 28,301 4463 1187 20,509
1992  27,824 4251 1156 20,459
1993  27,381 4064 1120 20,364
1994  27,540 4074 1130 20,585
1995  27,904 4136 1153 20,964
1996 28,096 4239 1068 21,164
1997  28,593 4278 1086 21,646
1998 28,767 4295 1096 21,769
1999  29,135 4120 1121 22,325
2000  29,554 3995 1121 22,858
2001 29,888 3824 1151 23,372
2002  30,076 3630 1162 23,737
2003  30,366 3439 1160 24,188
2004  30,659 3289 1141 24,566
2005 31,007 3120 1128 24,987
2006  31,344 3014 1115 25,366
2007  31,545 2966 1133 25,563
2008 31,780 2867 1148 25,880
2009  30,997 2611 1148 25,512
2010 30,694 2514 1092 25,320
Source: ONS.
Note: Data counts number of jobs and therefore is the broadest measure where a person with two  jobs is counted twice. Data are seasonally adjusted and
includes self-employed.
have one result, the ofﬁcial statistics ﬂatter the job creating performance of the private sector and obscure the extent to
which new job creation since Thatcher has depended on government spending. In the case of privatisation, the result is
a kind of social book-keeping adjustment in the employment ﬁgures because the public sector workforce diminishes and
the private sector workforce increases with each privatisation. The overall effect can be roughly measured by counting the
workforce at the point of privatisation as we have done in 16 major cases.1 The calculation shows that in the Thatcher and
Major years from 1979 to 1997, privatisation transferred some 825,000 individual public sector workers into the private
sector: strikingly, the number of private workers would actually have fallen without this adjustment. It is altogether more
difﬁcult to work out the effects of outsourcing and sub-contract which grows the para-state sector, where an increasing
number of employees (in activities like nursery education or care for the elderly) work for a private ﬁrm which is publicly
funded. We  have developed two methods for estimating the dependence of job creation on public funding: ﬁrst, we  can
construct a long-run series for the whole of the post-1979 period by using the aggregate total of education, health and public
administration jobs as a three sector proxy for publicly funded employment; second, for the post-1997 period we  can build
up a more ﬁne grained, multi sector analysis of the number employed in the para-state by adding together sectoral estimates
based on the importance of government demand in different sectors.
The simplest way to construct a long run series of publicly funded employment is by approximation if we treat all
employment in health, education and public administration as publicly funded. This approximation captures the truth that
public funding sustains almost all the employment in these sectors. The three sectors are variously supported by direct central
state expenditure on objects like schools and hospitals; local and national government subvention of charges by private care
homes and nursery schools; and tax breaks and subsidised training which beneﬁt private medicine and education. These
three sectors are also the large scale employers of state and para-state workforces; total employment in the three sectors
increases from 5.7 million to 8.5 million between 1979 and 2010. If these sectors are not 100% dependent on state funding,
1 The companies are Amersham International, Associated British Ports, BAA, BP, British Aerospace, British Airways, British Gas, British Shipbuilders, British
Steel  (UK workforce), British Telecom, Jaguar, National Freight Corp, National Power, PowerGen, Rolls Royce, Water, 12 Regional electricity companies.
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Fig. 4. UK private sector and public sector employment 1979–2010.
any overstatement on this count of three large sectors only counterweights all the state funded employment which is not
captured in other smaller sectors.
The result is not perfect but it provides a good, easily calculated, long term proxy and the results are quite startling. Over
the whole period 1979–2010, the three sectors account for 2.84 million extra employees or 67.5% of the total increase of 4.3
million employees. And this is not a recent development driven by New Labour proﬂigacy which encouraged an enlarged
state that the Tories did not. Under Thatcher and Major from 1979 to 1997, employment in the three sectors increased by one
million and this accounted for 86% of the total 1.2 million increase in employees. Mrs. Thatcher’s practice of government was
complicated and interesting because her public rhetoric and her theatre of reform was  pro-market and private sector; but, in
an undisclosed way through government expenditure, she built the state. And New Labour does no more than continue this
practice, so that in the Blair years from 1997 to 2010 the three sectors account for 1.9 million extra employees, equivalent
to some 60% of the total increase in employees. The three sectors actually account for a smaller per cent of the total increase
in employment under New Labour, although the absolute increase in employment in these three sectors each year is larger
under New Labour with average increases of 132,000 per year, as compared with 60,000 per year under Thatcher and Major.
The most important point is that three sector employment increases virtually every year2 by an average of 92,000 thousand
from 1979 to 2010.
It is possible to construct a more ﬁne grained analysis of developments under New Labour using reworked ofﬁcial statistics
to discover which sectors generated the extra jobs. This is necessary because state employees are now working alongside
increasing numbers of publicly funded but privately employed workers in social care, nursery education and outsourced
local government services. In this case we proceed by estimating publicly funded employment for 37 sectors. This is done by
reworking the ofﬁcial Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) 4-digit activity group totals of employees in the ONS’ Annual
Business Inquiry (ABI), which has been published every year since 1998. Publicly funded employment is calculated by
multiplying total employment in each sector in 1998 and 2008 by an estimate of the proportion of ﬁnal demand in that
sector attributable to public spending. The procedure is robust because employment is concentrated in a few sectors (health,
education, social work and social control) and it discloses 1.7 million publicly funded and privately employed workers.
Effectively, the three sector long-run proxy and the multi sector estimate overlap so that the one corroborates the other
(Fig. 4).
2 The exceptions are 1989, 1998 and 2007.
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Fig. 5. Analysis of UK employment change between 1998 and 2008 split by private sector and state and para-state sector.
The multi sector estimates for the New Labour years conﬁrm that state and para-state (S&PS) employment makes a
major contribution to job creation. As Fig. 5 shows, S&PS employment increased by nearly 1.3 million from 6.2 to 7.5 million
between 1998 and 2008. This accounted for no less than 55% of the total increase of 2.3 million in the number of employees
from 24.4 million to 26.7 million on the ABI measure. The pattern from 1998 to 2008 is one of sustained increase on a large
base with a 17% increase in S&PS employment over the decade after 1998, so that S&PS together employ nearly 7.6 million
or 28% of the workforce by 2008. The weight and force of S&PS employment creation, as well as the huge base, is such that, if
the UK has a ‘leading sector’, it is the state. And this represents a long run continuity which aligns the employment outcome
of the 1990s and 2000s with pre-1979 trends. The difference is that authors like Bacon and Eltis (1976) could then argue that
the expansion of state employment was ‘crowding out’ the private sector but 30 years later the long run trend now looks
more like ﬁlling in for an anaemic private sector.
In terms of gender and contribution to the creation of female employment, S&PS made a much larger contribution.
Employment in the S&Ps sector is heavily gendered because rank and ﬁle workers in health and education are dispropor-
tionately female. In both 1998 and 2008, just over 69.3% of the S&PS workforce is female and this group splits more or
less equally into half full-time and half part-time female workers, whereas only 21.2% of male S&PS workers are part-time.
The end result is that the S&PS sector is dominant in the creation of new full-time and part-time jobs for women. As Fig. 5
shows over the period 1998–2008, S&PS accounts for an extra 944,027 female jobs which split 55–45 between full-time and
part-time; and these new jobs account for no less than 81.6% of the total 1.2 million increase in female employment over
these years. If high income capitalist countries are changing because wage earning households are increasingly dependent
on two wage earners, in the UK case, the S&PS sector more than any other puts the second wage earner into the average
household.
The message of this section is twofold. First, we  should and can develop new measures of employment creation which
focus on the drivers of job creation which are as relevant as the number of jobs created. Second, that any new measures will
raise questions about UK dependence on state funded employment and the unsolved problem of the weakness of the private
sector. The 30-year enterprise experiment cannot have succeeded if the creation of extra jobs was, under Tories and Labour,
dependent on (unsustainable) continuous increases in public spending on health and education. And, as we  will argue in the
next section, cut backs in public expenditure will now greatly aggravate the regional problem in the UK.
5. Regional problems and the end of the national settlement
If the British are in the middle of a process of rediscovering the value of the national economy, there are many awkward
and difﬁcult issues which they have yet to take on board. The national economy cannot now be a kind of “found object”
as it was for Keynes in the 1930s because regional differences are sharply increasing in the 2010s. The paradox is that the
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Table 2
Number of people claiming any ‘out of work’ beneﬁts split by Government Ofﬁce Regions (November 2010).
‘Out of work’ beneﬁts Total economically
active
‘Out of work’ beneﬁt
claimants as a share of
total economically active
All aged 16–64 ‘Out of work’ beneﬁt
claimants as a share of
all aged 16–64
No.  No. % No. %
North East 265,610 1,259,000 21.1 1,682,000 15.8
Wales 292,740 1,455,000 20.1 1,895,000 15.4
North West 663,250 3,432,000 19.3 4,434,000 15.0
Scotland 478,000 2,695,000 17.7 3,400,000 14.1
West  Midlands 467,940 2,671,000 17.5 3,448,000 13.6
Yorks  and Humber 443,640 2,618,000 16.9 3,406,000 13.0
London 669,040 4,151,000 16.1 5,403,000 12.4
East  Midlands 325,600 2,301,000 14.2 2,890,000 11.3
South  West 326,160 2,704,000 12.1 3,286,000 9.9
East  349,760 3,007,000 11.6 3,680,000 9.5
South  East 463,570 4,461,000 10.4 5,389,000 8.6
Total 4,745,310 30,754,000 15.4 38,913,000 12.2
Source: Nomis, ONS.
Note: The ‘Out of Work’ beneﬁts category is deﬁned by Nomis, using a DWP  derived deﬁnition of ‘Key out of work beneﬁts’.
national economy is now being rediscovered as it is ceasing to exist in its traditional political and economic sense as a
political space of negotiation and an economic space of redistribution which guarantees minimum standards for all regions
and individuals within its boundaries. If that claim appears to be hyperbole, that is because the standard outcome measures
on unemployment produce indicators obscure the pre-2008 position of the ex-industrial areas which had lost manufacturing
employment and gained nothing except para-state jobs. Unemployment rates were relatively low, even in the ex-industrial
regions; but that was because other forms of beneﬁt like invalidity beneﬁt were being used to maintain a surplus workforce.
This outcome was in itself a perverse result of the privileging of unemployment rates as a politically sensitive indicator.
Humane family doctors and realistic beneﬁts ofﬁcers effectively colluded to park up workers on invalidity beneﬁt when
there were no suitable jobs within or outside their locality. In these circumstances, the relevant measure of dependence and
discouragement is not the percentage of the workforce unemployed but the share of the employable population on all forms
of beneﬁt, and that is much higher.
Once again, a very different non-standard story can be told by putting together fragments of evidence and, in this case,
simply adding up the numbers of those on different kinds of beneﬁt. In Table 2 we  have calculated the number and proportion
of the economically active population who are out of work and drawing some form of beneﬁt on grounds of unemployment
or invalidity. As a point of reference we also include a calculation of beneﬁts against all aged 16–64, where the denominator
includes the discouraged and those ineligible for beneﬁt. The regional contrast is quite startling and the predicament of
the ex-industrial regions is dire because here the settlement after deindustrialisation created a new Speenhamland which
offered full maintenance for a wholly unemployed industrial population. The North East and Wales have over 20% of their
economically active population on out of work beneﬁts and the West Midlands and Scotland around 17.5%. By way of
contrast, the percentage on some form of out of work beneﬁt in the South East is no more than 9.0%. London has a much
higher rate of 16.1% on out of work beneﬁt, indicating the extent of the deprivation which co-exists with great wealth in that
city.
If part of the problem is the ex-industrial areas which have no autonomous private sector capable of job creation, the
other part of the problem is that London (or London and some select parts of the South and East) are drawing away from
the rest of the economy because they do have job creating private sectors (even if ﬁnance creates no new net jobs). In the
previous section, we presented national ﬁgures using the Centre for Research in Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) method for
calculating publicly funded employment in the (private) para-state sector and then added these para-state totals to those
of state employees (Buchanan et al., 2009, pp. 16–19). Table 3 presents regional ﬁgures using the same method. The story
is that employment in ﬁnance may  be ﬂat but London was  creating jobs (and not only para-state jobs) unlike any other
region. Between 1998 and 2007, London created more than 400,000 jobs and more than two-thirds of these jobs were in the
private sector and not dependent on public funding. This was  signiﬁcantly higher than the next best performing region, the
South East, which managed to create 333,000 extra jobs, of which 56% were private sector; and hugely different from the
worst performing region of the West Midlands where private sector employment was declining and all of the 65,000 job net
increase and more was publicly funded.
After drawing this regional contrast in the New Labour years, we can make two  important supplementary points. First,
the extra jobs in London were of no beneﬁt to native born British because there is no net in-migration into London from
other British regions in the 2000s (as there was from the North and the West into the Midlands and South East in the 1930s).
A report by Gordon, Travers, and Whitehead (2007) notes that employment in London increased by some 388,000 between
1997 and 2006; however, more than 85% of the new jobs are held by London residents born outside the UK. The authors
broaden the analysis to consider all net new jobs at London workplaces, including those who  travel into London to work and
ﬁnd that all of the new employees were born outside the UK. Second, the contrast between London and the ex-industrial
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Table 3
Analysis of regional employment change between 1998 and 2008 split by private sector and state and para-state sector.
Total Of which Female total Of which Male total Of which
No. Private
sector (%)
State and
para-state (%)
No. Private
sector (%)
State and
para-state (%)
No. Private
sector (%)
State and
para-state (%)
North East 85,372 26.9 73.1 38,876 −5.4 105.4 46,496 53.9 46.1
North  West 215,535 38.4 61.6 120,642 15.2 84.8 94,893 68.0 32.0
Yorks  and Humber 182,627 33.2 66.8 111,534 6.5 93.5 71,093 75.0 25.0
East  Midlands 138,857 40.0 60.0 50,394 −29.1 129.1 88,463 79.3 20.7
West Midlands 64,609 −79.0 179.0 42,559 −103.0 203.0 22,050 −32.6 132.6
East 204,884 45.9 54.1 98,644 21.8 78.2 106,240 68.2 31.8
London 404,438 67.2 32.8 196,405 56.0 44.0 208,033 77.8 22.2
South  East 332,643 56.4 43.6 133,581 25.1 74.9 199,062 77.4 22.6
South  West 289,744 54.7 45.3 141,769 32.4 67.6 147,975 75.9 24.1
Wales  144,955 45.6 54.4 73,615 21.4 78.6 71,340 70.6 29.4
Scotland 258,542 40.7 59.3 149,085 14.3 85.7 109,457 76.6 23.4
Total  2,322,206 45.4 54.6 1,157,104 18.4 81.6 1,165,102 72.2 27.8
Source: Nomis.
Note: The table is a measure of employees not jobs (where an employee can have more than one job). Data excludes self-employment and Northern Ireland.
Fig. 6. Regional GVA per head compared to London in 1989 and 2009.
regions is even more marked after 2008 because the job losses of recession are concentrated in the North and West. In the
worst economic downturn since the war, between 2007 and 2010, some 712,500 jobs were lost nationally but more than
85% of that total or some 621,200 were lost in the ex-industrial regions of the West and North. By way of contrast, the East,
East Midlands and South East regions each suffered job losses of no more than 50,000; and the number of jobs in London
actually increased by just over 5000.
The huge difference between patterns of job creation is such that the second standard indicator of output already shows
a widening gap between London and the regions. Fig. 6 compares gross value added (GVA) per capita3 in the UK regions
against London whose income serves as a base of 100 in both 1989 and 2009.
3 Gross value added (GVA) is deﬁned by the ONS as follows: ‘Gross value added is the difference between output and intermediate consumption for any
given  sector/industry. That is the difference between the value of goods and services produced and the cost of raw materials and other inputs which are
used  up in production’ (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/glossary/economic terms.asp). GVA is also sometimes referred to as net output. GVA per capita
is  calculated by dividing the total GVA by the population.
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The point of the comparison is that all regions (including the South East) fall behind London over these 20 years but the
fall is greatest in the West and the North. Thus the three laggard regions of the North East, West Midlands and Wales fall by
an average of 9 percentage points against London GVA per capita, so that at the end of this period each one of these regions
has a GVA per capita which is less than half that of London. The Welsh GVA per capita was 54% of that in London in 1989
and only 43% by 2009: if this trend were to continue, Welsh GVA by 2029 would be no more than one-third of London GVA
per capita.
Under New Labour, the ex-industrial regions were being kept aﬂoat by a kind of social settlement which combined publicly
funded employment and beneﬁts: this is now being withdrawn with the impending public expenditure cuts. The evidence
in this section raises questions about whether the national is still the relevant unit of analysis because the British are not
all in the same boat but, increasingly, they are locked into different compartments with few of the traditional connections
established by internal migration or politically sponsored redistribution. This has not been taken on board in the Keynesian
enthusiasm for reﬂationary plan B to encourage growth. In a regionally divided economy, Keynesian reﬂationary expansion
to expand employment and output is irrelevant to new realities: most forms of ﬁscal stimulus would not effectively reach
the ex-industrial regions where half a million jobs have been lost; meanwhile stimulus may be unnecessary in London
where employment is increasing. The immediate problem in Britain (and indeed in most high income capitalist countries)
is distribution not growth.
6. Conclusion
This article makes an argument and presents illustrative empirics on the British case which shows how the standard
economic measures of GDP and unemployment can be misleading measures of national success and failure. Or, more exactly,
that these measures are misleading when they are abstracted from context and read uncritically, as they were in Britain
before the ﬁnancial crisis because they then assumed a speciﬁc capitalist context (with, for example an autonomous private
sector) which did not exist in the British case. This basic point needs to be made clearly because all the misunderstandings
from the pre-2008 period are being carried over into solutions, insofar as the standard Left Keynesian ﬁx for recession in
2008, or double dip in 2011, is reﬂation to boost GDP and generate employment. As readers of this article will understand,
this kind of generic preference does not engage with the structural speciﬁcs of trade constraint and private sector anaemia
in the British case.
The implication is that we need to engage national speciﬁcs via new measures and a more sophisticated reading of existing
measures. As this article demonstrates, this kind of shift is perfectly practical and immediately within the realm of the possible
because it requires not so much a radical change of paradigm but a progressive kind of bricolage which puts together different
existing series, reworks ﬁgures by estimation and thereby puts together a case speciﬁc understanding of what drives and
limits employment creation in different national cases. These are good reasons for putting this kind of political arithmetic
at the centre of a revitalised economics, but it is also true that the current cadre of economists (mainstream or behavioural)
have invested their intellectual capital in other methods and objects so that they are probably incapable of the necessary
shift.
Is this not then a huge opportunity for a new generation of socially minded accountants? After all, their core skills already
include the capacity to read through company accounts and contextual information so that they see how bottom line results
are produced; and many of these company accounts skills should be transposable to reading national accounts. And, when
it comes to the formulation of new measures, accountants are well qualiﬁed to propose modiﬁcations and supplements. If
national income accounting was devised by economists in the 1940s, the proposers of value added accounting frameworks
in the 1970s, like Cox (1979) and Gray and Maunders (1980),  demonstrated the role that accountants and engineers can have
in devising new and socially relevant measures of welfare and distribution. If accountants can move outside their comfort
zones in ﬁnancial reporting and in critical commentary, they could now make a major contribution.
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